SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses
of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners.In so doing;
we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreastof some of
the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ACT

DOES

AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITY UNDER NUISANCE THE-

oRY-Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Borough of Medford
Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 449 A.2d 472 (1982).
In 1969 the residents of the Birchwood Lakes area of the town of
Medford began to notice a disturbing change in the environmental
quality of their lakes. A drastic increase in the amount of algae and
aquatic weeds was killing the fish and rendering the lakes unsuitable
for most recreational purposes. By the early 1970's the condition was
such that the lakes were unusable for most of the year. The Borough of
Medford Lakes operated a sewage treatment plant five hundred feet
upstream from Birchwood Lakes which discharged treated sewage
into the stream. The Medford Lakes sewage plant had been constructed in 1939 and was substantially reconstructed in 1964. The
plans for both the original construction and the subsequent modification were approved by the Department of Health, which at the time
was responsible for the regulation of sewage treatment plants. 90 N.J.
at 588, 449 A.2d at 475.
After conducting an investigation, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) released a report in March of 1972 finding
that the deterioration of the Birchwood Lakes was caused by nutrients
in excess of DEP standards contained in the effluents discharged from
the Medford Lakes sewage plant. Medford Lakes was ordered to
rectify the situation by the end of 1972 but objected to the terms of the
DEP order. An agreement was eventually negotiated whereby the
Borough was to begin construction on improvements to the sewage
plant in 1974. Further delays developed and the DEP was forced to
file suit against Medford Lakes to compel abatement of the pollution.
Under the terms of the resulting consent judgment, pollution abatement facilities were to be implemented by January 1979. Id. at 589,
449 A.2d at 475.
In the meantime, in 1975, the Birchwood Lakes Colony Club,
Inc., an organization representing residents of the Birchwood Lakes
area, filed suit for damages and injunctive relief against the Borough
of Medford Lakes alleging various acts of negligence in the construction and operation of the plant proximately causing their injury. The
Borough interposed defenses of immunity arising under the Tort
Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59: 1-1 to 12-3 (West 1982). The jury
found the defendant negligent in several respects and awarded the
plaintiff damages accordingly. 90 N.J. at 589-90, 449 A.2d at 475-76.
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On defendant's appeal, the appellate division found inconsistencies in the jury's determination of the negligence issues. More importantly, the court held that the trial judge should have instructed the
jury on the theory of nuisance and that its failure to do so constituted
plain error. Id. at 590-91, 449 A.2d at 476. The appellate court also
rejected the defendant's claim of immunity under the Tort Claims
Act. On appeal by the defendant, Borough of Medford Lakes, the
supreme court considered two issues, namely, whether a municipality
may be held liable under a theory of nuisance for damage to private
property owners caused by the municipality's discharge of sewage,
and whether the Tort Claims Act provides immunity from such liability. Id. at 587, 449 A.2d at 474.
The supreme court rejected the Borough's argument that it could
not be held liable for nuisance because the Tort Claims Act, as the sole
source of public entity tort liability, does not expressly authorize suits
under the theory of nuisance. After reviewing the law of nuisance in
New Jersey, the court concluded that riparian owners may bring an
action in nuisance for water pollution from discharged sewage if the
discharge constitutes an unreasonable use. Id. at 592-93, 449 A.2d at
477. To decide if this principle also applies against public entities the
court looked to specific provisions of the Tort Claims Act. The court
first examined N.J. STAT ANN. § 59: 4-2 (West 1982) which establishes
liability on the part of a public entity for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of its property. Under that section, liability is imposed
only when the corrective action taken by the entity, or the failure to
take any action, is "palpably unreasonable." The court interpreted
this section as retaining the common law liability of municipalities for
nuisance subject to a "palpably unreasonable" standard. 90 N.J. at
593-94, 449 A.2d at 478.
The court also found that a municipality could be held liable for
nuisance under the Tort Claims Act by virtue of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:
2-2 (West 1982) which makes public entities liable for injuries caused
by the acts of public employees to the same extent that a private
individual would be. The court construed the section to be a flexible
liability provision allowing courts to apply the Tort Claims Act to the
particular circumstances of an individual case. In short, the court
found no evidence of an intent to exempt public entities from liability
for nuisance within the pertinent portions of the Act. 90 N.J. at 59496, 449 A.2d at 479.
Having decided that the Tort Claims Act did not exempt the
Borough of Medford Lakes from possible liability for nuisance, the
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court next considered whether the Act's immunity provisions precluded the Borough's being held liable. Medford Lakes asserted two
statutory immunities: plan and design immunity, under section 59:4-6
and discretionary immunity, under section 59:2-3. Emphasizing the
role of the pertinent regulatory agency in determining permissible
effluent levels, the court noted that when a discharge permit dictates
certain conditions and the public entity complies therewith, no liability will be imputed. On the other hand, no immunity will be recognized when the public entity chooses to postpone corrective measures
when no discharge level has been set or when it has been exceeded.
Thus, the court held that Medford Lakes would be extended plan and
design immunity only if it could demonstrate that the excessive
amount of nutrients in its discharge was contemplated by the state
approved construction plans for the plant. Id. at 598-99, 449 A.2d at
480-81. On the issue of discretionary immunity the court found the
record incomplete as to whether the Borough's failure to abate the
pollution constituted an excusable act of discretion under the Act. Id.
at 601, 449 A.2d at 482. The court made clear that on remand
Medford Lakes was to bear the burden of establishing its immunity.
Id. at 602, 449 A.2d at 483.
One final problem presented by the case was the fact that part of
the damage was suffered before July 1, 1972, the effective date of the
Tort Claims Act, and part thereafter. The court dealt with this problem by holding that as to damage suffered after the effective date of
the act the plaintiff must show that the action causing the damage was
"palpably unreasonable." Similarly, the court recognized that if Medford Lakes succeeded in establishing discretionary immunity it would
only extend back as far as the effective date of the Act. For these
reasons the court noted that an apportionment of damages between
the two segments of time might be necessary. Id. at 603, 449 A.2d at
483.
The supreme court's decision in this case is noteworthy because it
indicates a willingness on the part of the court to go beyond a literal
and mechanical interpretation of the Tort Claims Act to create a more
flexible scheme of public entity tort liability. The court treats the Act
not so much as the "last word" on the subject of public entity tort
liability, but more like a general framework for the resolution of
claims against public entities. This approach could lead to a wider
scope of liability for public entities than the drafters of the Tort
Claims Act originally envisioned.
R.F.W.
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CLAUSE-Laborers' Local Union Nos. 472 & 172 v. Interstate
Curb & Sidewalk, 90 N.J. 456, 448 A.2d 980 (1982).
Universal Utility, Inc. (Universal) and Laborers' Local Unions
472 and 172 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant
to this agreement, Universal must pay contributions to certain funds
which provide medical and pension benefits to covered employees. In
1978 a dispute arose in which the unions alleged that Universal was
evading its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement by
using "alter ego corporations." Informal efforts to resolve the dispute
failed, and pursuant to the binding arbitration clause of the collective
bargaining agreement, the unions and funds brought the matter before an arbitrator. 90 N.J. at 460, 448 A.2d at 982.
The arbitrator found that Universal and the alleged alter ego
corporations were in fact the same business entity and that Universal
had been using these shell corporations to avoid its obligations under
the agreement. The arbitrator, therefore, ordered an accounting to
determine the amount owed by Universal and its alter ego corporations to the funds. Id. at 461, 448 A.2d at 983.
The unions and funds filed a complaint in the superior court,
chancery division, seeking to confirm the arbitrator's award. In response to the allegation that it had failed to comply with the terms of
the collective agreement and the arbitrator's award, Universal contended that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter
and further that it was no longer an "operating company" and hence,
not subject to the collective bargaining agreement. The alter ego
corporations, Cardell Enterprises and Cardell Construction Co. (Cardell), which did not participate in the arbitration proceedings,
claimed lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator and lack of
due process. The chancery division confirmed the arbitrator's decision. The appellate division reversed, holding that the arbitrator was
without authority to determine whether any party, other than the
signatory, was subject to the binding arbitration terms of the agreement and vacated the arbitration award that was based on that
finding. Id. at 461-62, 448 A.2d at 983.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the union's petition
for certification and affirmed that part of the appellate division's
decision which found a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator to decide the issue of identity among the defendant corporations.
The court determined the arbitrator's jurisdiction to be dependent
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upon the actual agreement between the parties. Where, as in the
instant case, there was no express provision granting jurisdiction to the
arbitrator, the court held the issue of arbitrability to be within the
province of the judiciary. Id. at 463, 448 A.2d at 984. Rather than
vacate the arbitration award, however, as did the appellate division,
the court remanded the matter to the chancery division and concluded
that if that court determined that Cardell was, in fact, the alter ego of
Universal, then the arbitrator's exercise of jurisdiction was proper,
and the award would bind Cardell as well as Universal. This would
be so even though the former was neither a signatory to the agreement
nor a participant in the arbitration proceedings. Id. at 463-64, 448
A.2d at 984-85.
The court dismissed Cardell's due process claim concluding that
if the chancery division were to find identity among the corporations,
notice and service upon Universal would represent adequate notice
and service upon Cardell. Id. at 466, 448 A.2d at 986.
Justice O'Hern filed a separate concurring opinion in which he
cautioned that the judicial role in the law of labor arbitration should
be restricted and concluded that the remand should be limited to a
determination of whether the Cardell corporations received proper
notice. Id. at 469-70, 448 A.2d at 987-88 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
The court's decision is not surprising. The court relied upon the
established principle that an arbitrator's authority is circumscribed by
the agreement between the parties. Following this principle to its
logical conclusion the court reasoned that if the collective bargaining
agreement was silent as to the arbitrator's authority over the nonsignatory parties, it would be incongruous to hold that this arbitrator
could be empowered to make a determination of whether the nonsignatory party could be bound by the compulsory arbitration clause.
LABOR
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Council of New Jersey State College Locals v. State Board of
Higher Education, 91 N.J. 18, 449 A.2d 1244 (1982); Bethlehem
Board of Education v. Bethlehem Education Association, 91 N.J.
38, 449 A.2d 1254 (1982).
In May of 1980 Chancellor T. Edward Hollander sent to the
State Board of Higher Education for approval regulations he had
formulated to establish uniform procedures for the reduction of state
college staffs during times of fiscal emergency. The exclusive union
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representative of all full-time faculty and nonmanagerial and professional employees in the state colleges, the Council of New Jersey State
College Locals, NJFST-AFT/AFL-CIO (Council), did not participate
in the formulation of these regulations and its requests to submit the
regulations to collective negotiation prior to adoption were denied.
On February 4, 1981 the regulations went into effect. 91 N.J. at 23,
449 A.2d at 1246.
An action was brought by the Council challenging the preemptive effect of the regulations on collective negotiations. The appellate
division, on the basis of State v. State Supervisory Employees Association, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978), held that negotiations were
preempted on subject matters explicitly covered by the regulations.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the Council's petition for
certification. 91 N.J. at 23-24, 449 A.2d at 1247.
In July of 1978, the State Board of Education adopted regulations
requiring local school boards to develop criteria and procedures by
which to evaluate tenured teachers. The regulations required that
each school district's chief administrator oversee the development of
such policies and procedures "in consultation with" those teachers
having tenure. 91 N.J. 42, 449 A.2d at 1256. During the same year,
the Bethlehem Township Education Association in the process of
collective bargaining submitted several proposals to the Bethlehem
Township Board of Education dealing with teacher evaluation. The
Board refused to discuss these proposals contending that negotiations
on the subject of teacher evaluation were preempted as a result of the
State Board's regulations. The Board petitioned the Public Employment Relations Commission (Commission) for a scope of negotiations
determination. Id. at 42-43, 449 A.2d at 1257.
Later in 1978, the Linden Education Association requested negotiation on the subject of teacher evaluation. As the Bethlehem Board
had, the Linden Board of Education raised the issue of preemption
and filed for a scope of negotiations determination by the Commission. The Commission, in a joint decision, held that the regulations
did not totally preempt negotiations on the subject of teacher evaluation but did preempt negotiations on those terms and conditions of
employment for which the regulations specifically provided. After an
examination of each individual proposal put forth by the Bethlehem
Association, the Commission determined that all but two of the
submitted proposals were nonnegotiable. Id. at 43, 449 A.2d at
1257.
The appellate division affirmed the Commission's decision. The
Bethlehem and Linden Boards petitioned for certification and the
respective union representatives cross-petitioned for certification. Id.
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at 44, 449 A.2d at 1257. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted all
petitions. 87 N.J. 396, 434 A.2d 1076 (1981).
Writing for the court in Council, Justice Handler affirmed and
modified the appellate division decision and reaffirmed the court's
prior decision in State v. State Supervisory Employeees Association, 78
N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978), which held that negotiations are preempted whenever a term or condition of employment has been "definitely and specifically" set by a statute or regulation. He went on,
however, to point out that while the regulations in State Supervisory
were promulgated by an agency having broad regulatory power over
all state employees, namely the Civil Service Commission, the regulations in Council were promulgated by an agency involved in both
employer and regulatory functions. 91 N.J. at 23, 449 A.2d at 1248.
Because the Board's dual role might conceivably permit it to use its
preemptive regulatory power to preclude negotiations to which its
employees are entitled, the court hesitated to categorically apply the
holding of State Supervisory to the facts of Council. The court instead
held that when an agency acts as both regulator and employer, regulations fixing terms and conditions of employment do not necessarily
preempt negotiation on the subject. There is, however, a presumption
of preemption, which may be overcome by proof that the regulations
were adopted in bad faith, were arbitrary or were passed mainly to
avoid negotiations. Id. at 28, 449 A.2d at 1249. The court then
examined the regulations in question and determined that they were
passed in good faith by an agency acting primarily as a regulator and
were thus deserving of preemptive treatment as to the matters they
specifically addressed. Id. at 29, 449 A.2d at 1249.
With regard to the scope of the preemption doctrine, the court
asserted that it applies only to regulations which fix terms and conditions of employment "expressly, specifically and comprehensively."
Id. The court noted that if the term or condition of employment is one
that involves management prerogatives, it is nonnegotiable and,
therefore, the preemption doctrine would not be relevant. Negotiation in the context of public education is required only when the terms
and conditions of employment "directly [affect] the work and welfare
of the college employees, [relate] to the terms and conditions of employment . . . and [do] not affect any major educational policy." Id.
at 30-31, 449 A.2d at 1250 (quoting Association of State College
Facultiesv. New Jersey Board of Higher Education, 66 N.J. 72, 76-77,
328 A.2d 235, 236 (1974)).
Thus the court held that the regulations involving substantive
decisions as to staff reductions were nonnegotiable because they were
within the scope of managerial discretion while those involving proce-

1983]

SURVEY

dures for the implementation of such substantive decisions were negotiable because they did not infringe on managerial policy prerogatives. Id. at 32, 449 A.2d 1251. More particularly, the court indicated
that regulations which leave discretion to the public employer are not
preemptive of negotiation on the subject because they are not comprehensive. Regulations setting minimum or maximum terms or conditions of employment are not in the imperative and, therefore, negotiation is required within the parameters of the established standards. Id.
at 33-34, 449 A.2d at 1252.
The final issue the court addressed was whether the regulations
violated the state's tenure statute by providing that affirmative action
should be taken into account in determining staff reductions in times
of fiscal crisis. Id. at 35, 449 A.2d at 1253. The court refused to apply
the tenure statute in this context, holding that the tenure statute was
enacted only to deal with reduction of staff due to a natural diminution in the number of pupils. The court further noted that statutory
protections of tenure do not obtain in cases of fiscal emergency. Id. at
36, 449 A.2d at 1253.
Justice Schreiber concurred with the Council opinion but contended that the validity of a regulation promulgated by a state agency
does not depend upon whether the persons regulated are employees of
the regulatory agency. Id. at 37-38, 449 A.2d 1254 (Schreiber, J.,
concurring).
In Bethlehem, the companion case, the court was called upon to
determine when a regulation preempts negotiation on a term or condition of employment. 91 N.J. at 44, 449 A.2d at 1256. Applying the
same reasoning as in Council, the court held that for a regulation to
preempt negotiations it must "expressly, specifically and comprehensively," id., 449 A.2d at 1257, fix a term or condition of employment.
In other words, the regulation must "speak in the imperative." Id. at
45, 449 A.2d at 1257. In light of these requirements, the court analyzed the proposals set forth by the Bethlehem Association pertaining
to the evaluation of tenured teachers. It determined that only two
concerned purely procedural matters outside the scope of managerial
prerogatives and hence remained negotiable. The appellate division
decision was accordingly affirmed. Id. at 51, 449 A.2d at 1261. Justice
Schreiber concurred in the result.
In both Council and Bethlehem the court was called upon to
determine whether agency regulations may preempt collective negotiations on the same subject. The court did not lay down any hard and
fast rules but rather set up a flexible standard capable of being applied
to different situations and yielding an equitable result.
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MORTGAGES-PmiorITY OF LIENS-OrIONAL ADVANCE OF FUNDS
UNDER PREVIOUSLY RECORDED CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGE SUBORDINATE TO INTERVENING LIEN OF WHICH LENDER HAD CONSTRUCTIVE

KNOWLEDGE-Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association

v. Platt Homes, Inc., 185 N.J. Super. 457, 449 A.2d 553 (Ch.
Div.

1982).

Platt Homes, Inc. (Platt) borrowed $20,000 in January of 1979
from Robert Hedges in order to develop property owned by Platt. In
consideration for this loan, Hedges received a 40 % share of all profits
from the development of a specified lot. In May of 1979 Platt gave
Lincoln Federal Savings and Loan Association (Lincoln) a mortgage
on the same lot. This construction mortgage provided for discretionary advances of up to $94,500, with a starting advance of $39,500.
These subsequent advances were optional and to be provided at the
sole discretion of the lender. Lincoln promptly recorded its mortgage.
Shortly thereafter, on July 26, 1979, Hedges lent an additional

$10,000 to Platt. The parties entered into a new agreement whereby
Hedges relinquished any claim he had as to profits in return for a
$40,000 mortgage on the property. Hedges recorded his mortgage on
July 30 and 10 days later Lincoln made a second advance to Platt of
$27,200. Prior to making its second advance, Lincoln ordered a search
of the property which failed to disclose the intervening lien of Hedges.
Platt defaulted on both mortgages and a dispute arose as to the order
of priority between Hedges and Lincoln. 185 N.J. Super. at 459, 449
A.2d at 553-54.
Hedges conceded that Lincoln had priority as to its initial advance but argued that his intervening mortgage was prior to the
second advance made by Lincoln. Hedges relied upon the fact that his
mortgage had been recorded prior to the second advance of Lincoln,
thus giving Lincoln constructive notice of his intervening lien. Lincoln
argued that it did not have actual notice of Hedges' mortgage since the

search of the property had not disclosed that lien. Lincoln asserted
that only actual notice would be sufficient to defeat its priority position. The facts of the case were not disputed and both parties moved
for summary judgment.
The Hunterdon county chancery division court held that Hedges'
mortgage had priority over the second advance made by Lincoln. The
court began its analysis by summarizing the law of New Jersey in the
area of advances and based its analysis on a distinction between
optional and obligatory advances. Although it did not decide the
issue, it stated that the rule in New Jersey is that where the advances
are obligatory, and not optional, no intervening lien will defeat the
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priority of the lender. Such succesive advances are considered to be
part of a single transaction and relate back to the date upon which the
mortgage was recorded. Id. at 461-62, 449 A.2d at 555. When the
advance is optional on the part of the lender, however, the court
noted that actual notice of an intervening lien would subordinate any
subsequent advances. Id. at 462, 449 A.2d at 555. The court next
discussed the effect which constructive notice would have upon optional advances. In this regard, the court referred to the case of Ward
v. Cooke, 17 N.J. Eq. 93 (Ch. 1864), the leading case on the issue,
which held that discretionary future advances under a prior recorded
mortgage would not be subordinated to intervening liens of which the
lender had only constructive notice. 185 N.J. Super. at 464, 449 A.2d
at 556. The court held that Ward was distinguishable since it had
been decided prior to the enactment of the present recording act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:15-1 to :26-1 (West 1940 & Cum. Supp. 19821983). In choosing not to follow Ward, the court relied upon the
recording act's policy of promoting certainty in land transactions by
encouraging reliance upon the record. 185 N.J. Super. at 466, 449
A.2d at 558. Thus, the court held that constructive notice was sufficient notice to a lender making optional advances. Once Hedges'
mortgage became of record, Lincoln's second advance was placed in
the position of a subsequent mortgage for priority purposes. Lincoln
thus acted "at its peril" when it made the second advance and its only
remedy would be against the title company or searcher who had failed
to find Hedges' recorded mortgage. Id. at 465, 449 A.2d at 557.
In a lengthy closing footnote, the court acknowledged that its
decision would not extend to commercial loan situations which are
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. In such cases, future
advances are often secured by fluctuating nonreal property collateral
and a lender's priority as to all advances relates back to the original
filing. This priority position applies even to real estate mortgages, the
court noted, when the mortgage is given as "side collateral only." The
court posited, however, that such a case is clearly distinguishable from
one in which real property has been used as the sole security for a
construction mortgage. Id. at 467, 449 A.2d at 558.
The decision in Platt is totally consonant with the overall tenor of
New Jersey's recording act and the cases which have discussed it.
Equating constructive notice with actual notice in an optional advance situation effectuates the very purpose of the recording act by
encouraging creditors to make their claims of record and to search the
record before extending credit. Thus, if a prior recorded lender in the
position of Lincoln checks the record and finds an intervening lien, it
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may insist that the lien be extinguished before any future advances are
made.
T.M.D.

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-DISCIPLINARY

PROCEDURE-PrfE-

PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD SUFFICIENT FOR ADMINIS-

TRATIVE ADJUDICATION REGARDING PROFESSIONAL GUILT AND DISCIPLINE AGAINST LICENSED PHYSICIAN-In Re Polk License

Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7 (1982).
Five juvenile female patients filed a seven count complaint with
the State Board of Medical Examiners against Dr. Irwin J. Polk
charging him with sexual abuse. Polk, a Lincroft allergist, was specifically charged with gross malpractice, professional misconduct, a lack
of good moral character, and "an inability to act 'consistent with the
public's health, safety and welfare'," as required under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 45:1-21(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). The Board of Medical Examiners appointed a panel to investigate the charges levelled
against Polk. The five complainants, all of whom were patients of
Polk, testified as to the doctor's sexual impositions. The doctor's defense lasted three days and consisted of the testimony of thirty-four
witnesses. 90 N.J. at 558, 449 A.2d at 10-11.
The three member panel found that the complaining witnesses
were credible and that Polk had knowingly committed the acts complained of for sexual gratification rather than for medical reasons. Id.
at 559, 449 A.2d at 11. The panel recommended that Polk's medical
license be revoked. These conclusions were presented to the full Board
and were unanimously accepted along with the suggested penalty.
Polk appealed claiming that the preponderance of the evidence standard used by the Board was violative of due process and equal protection requirements. The appellate division reversed, holding that disciplinary proceedings against physicians and lawyers are similar and
that "considerations of fundamental fairness alone," id. at 559-60, 449
A.2d at 11-12 (quoting In Re Polk License Revocation, 178 N.J.
Super. 191, 194, 428 A.2d 551, 553 (App. Div. 1981)), make it
inconsistent to hold lawyers to a clear and convincing standard of
proof while physicians are held to the more easily established preponderance of the evidence standard.
On certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
Board's requirement that the charges be established by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence did
not violate due process and equal protection. Justice Handler, writing
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for the majority, noted that New Jersey has long recognized that the
usual standard for establishing claims in administrative proceedings is
a fair preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 560, 449 A.2d at 12. In
examining whether use of this standard in license revocation proceedings violates due process requirements under the fourteenth amendment and the state constitution, the court applied the test enunciated
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975), which requires the
balancing of three factors: the character of the private interest, the
nature of the opposing state interest, and the risk of error inherent in
the use of the specific burden of proof. 90 N.J. at 562, 449 A.2d at
13.
With regard to the first factor, the court noted that a license to
practice medicine has traditionally been considered a property right
subject to reasonable regulation rather than a fundamental right entitled to protection by a standard of proof greater than a fair preponderance. Moreover, although the private interest is considerable and
the potential deprivation great, a license revocation is not necessarily
permanent. Id. at 562-64, 449 A.2d at 13-14. With regard to the
second Mathews factor, the court stated that the government's interest
in assuring the health and welfare of the public is of preeminent
importance and that rights of physicians are secondary to regulations
protecting this interest. Finally, several reasons were asserted for
concluding that the use of the fair preponderance standard does not
entail an intolerable risk of error. First, strict substantive standards
defining professional misconduct must be met before proceeding in a
disciplinary action against a physician. Second, the physician is given
an opportunity to defend himself through the use of counsel and the
calling of witnesses. Third, both the Board and the licensee share a
common expertise in the medical profession and therefore the issues,
evidence, and professional standards are equally comprehensible to all
involved. Thus the court held that the preponderance of the evidence
standard did not violate Polk's rights under the federal and state
constitutions. Id. at 565-68, 449 A.2d at 15-17.
The court, in rejecting the claim of an equal protection violation,
noted that since professional licensure is not a fundamental right, a
state may treat various professions differently as long as the legislative
classification is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 570-71, 449 A.2d at 17. In this connection,
the court found that there were significant differences between the
medical and legal professions. For one thing, Justice Handler observed, the medical profession concerns itself with life and death
situations which are not usually present in the legal profession. Consequently, "[a] less stringent burden of proof in proceedings involving
medical licenses than in attorney disbarment proceedings can be
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viewed as more protective of society's important interest in individual
life and health and is therefore not irrational." Id. at 572, 442 A.2d at
18. Moreover, while the medical profession is regulated by a state
agency established by the legislature, discipline of lawyers is a responsibility of the judicial branch. Lawyers are an essential part of the
judicial system and, although they may be held to a higher burden of
proof, they are subject to more comprehensive regulation than are
physicians. In the practice of law every aspect of professional conduct
is subject to accountability and in light of the more pervasive regulation of the legal profession as a whole, it cannot be argued that
physicians are subject to invidious discrimination. Id. at 572-73, 449
A.2d at 18.
The court next held that the statutes proscribing gross malpractice and professional misconduct, alleged to have been violated, were
not unconstitutionally vague since Polk, as a practicing physician,
undoubtedly understood exactly what the statutes prohibited. Polk's
contention that the evidence was inadequate to establish the allegations brought against him was rejected because three credible witnesses had testified against him. In addition, the court rejected Polk's
claim that his due process rights had been violated merely because the
Deputy Attorney General who prosecuted the case also acted as the
Board's legal representative in other unrelated matters. Furthermore,
the court held that Polk was not entitled to an elimination or reduction of investigation costs charged against him. Id. at 573-77, 449
A.2d at 19-21.
Finally, the court examined whether the punishment imposed by
the Board was proper. The court noted that it had no power to
substitute its own judgment for that of an administrative tribunal
unless the agency had "mistakenly exercised its discretion or misperceived its own statutory authority." Id. at 578, 449 A.2d at 21. The
appropriate test in examining administrative sanctions is whether the
penalty so outweighs the committed offense as to offend an individual's sense of fairness. The court stated that while license revocation is
an appropriate remedy the Board has the duty, in view of the importance of licensure, to consider all factors including any circumstances
that would mitigate the penalty. Thus, in the interest of fairness, the
court remanded the case to the Board to reconsider the sanction,
noting that Polk would have an opportunity to present evidence germane to the punishment issue. Id. at 578-80, 449 A.2d at 21-22.
Justices Pashman and Clifford concurred with the majority opinion except on the issue of a remand, arguing that the court should not
interfere with the administrative decision. Justice Pashman stated that
since sexual abuse of patients is so reprehensible, revocation of a
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medical license is not extreme and any mitigating circumstances in
such a case would have to be "substantial indeed" to warrant a lesser
penalty. Id. at 580-81, 449 A.2d at 22-23 (Pashman, J., concurring).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has made it clear that a physician subject to disciplinary action is entitled to not only a fair opportunity to present a defense, but also a chance to present any mitigating
circumstances material to the issue of punishment. Also, in applying
the balancing test proposed in Mathews v. Eldridge, the court has
indicated that the state's substantial interest in protecting the health
and welfare of the public outweighs the private interest of the licensee, especially when the risk of error can be minimized. This
conclusion reinforces the validity of the preponderance of the evidence
standard for physicians in disciplinary proceedings. The continued use
of this standard will protect the public by making it easier to censure
and punish unprofessional conduct by a physician.
J.v.s.
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MACHINE-Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical

Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
On December 10, 1973 Eleanor J. Michalko's left hand was
amputated when caught in a thirty-five ton vertical press which she
had been operating in accordance with instructions given by her
employer, Elastimold, the owner of the machine. The press was not
equipped with safety devices. The machine, which was manufactured
by Elastimold's parent company, had been substantially rebuilt by the
Cubby Manufacturing Company (Cubby) in 1969 pursuant to an

agreement which required Cubby to follow Elastimold's specifications, and which did not include provisions for the installation of a
safety device. 91 N.J. at 391, 451 A.2d at 181. Although aware that
the machine was dangerous without a safety device and that such
devices were available, Cubby relied on its internal policies regarding
machine modifications, and did not install the device. Cubby assumed
Elastimold would install the device and did not warn Elastimold or
the foreseeable users of the press that its operation without the safety
device was dangerous. After completing the specified modifications
Cubby shipped the press to Elastimold where further work on the
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electrical and hydraulic systems rendered the press operational. Id. at
392, 451 A.2d at 182.
Mrs. Michalko and her husband sued Cubby alleging, among
other theories, strict liability. The trial court, at the close of the
evidence, dismissed the case with prejudice holding that Cubby was
not liable for several reasons, most notably because it had merely
followed the design specifications of the manufacturer who subsequently made "substantial changes" in the machine before it reached
the end users. Therefore, Cubby, as an independent contractor, had
no duty to inform Elastimold, a knowledgeable buyer, that the press
was dangerously designed. The trial court's reasoning was substantially adhered to in the appellate division's affirmance. The supreme
court granted certification. Id. at 393, 451 A.2d at 182. The supreme
court reversed, holding that strict liability may be imputed to an
independent contractor for failure to make a machine safe or warn
foreseeable users of inherent dangers, even though the contractor
merely rebuilds part of the machine on the owner's specifications. Id.
at 403, 451 A.2d at 187.
Writing for the court, Justice Handler asserted that in a design
defect case strict liability will be applied if the usefulness of the
product is outweighed by its inherent dangers. Once a product is
proved dangerous, knowledge of the risks will be imputed to defendant and lack of fault on the latter's part is irrelevant. Id. at 394-95,
451 A.2d at 183. Finding that these rules apply to "one engaged in
rebuilding machines or manufacturing component parts," id. at 395,
451 A.2d at 183, the court noted that the defendant could not escape
liability with the assertion that rebuilding in accordance with the
owner's specifications precluded the requisite control over the machine. The court observed that the defect did, in fact, exist when the
press was in the defendant's plant and under the defendant's control.
Id. at 396, 451 A.2d at 184. Distinguishing Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,
154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75
N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978), the court similarly rejected Cubby's
argument that following the contractual specifications precluded liability for design defects. In Sanner, the court held that the defendant's
duty was limited to following government specifications requiring the
manufacture of a jeep without seat belts where the government had
made a conscious determination that seat belts were incompatible
with the vehicle's intended use. In this case, the court noted, the
evidence would support a finding that there were compatible safety
devices available. 91 N.J. at 396-97, 451 A.2d at 184. In reply to
defendant's suggestion that trade custom is a determining factor in the
area of safety devices, the court acknowledged that Cubby's failure to
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install a safety device or issue warnings was consistent with current
trade custom, but it refused to allow adherence to trade custom as a
defense to strict liability claims. Id. at 397-98, 481 A.2d at 189.
With regard to the policy implications of Cubby's view of its
contractual obligations, the court warned that to allow defenses based
on notions of freedom of contract would "leave the determination as
to the safety of the product and the investment allocation in safety to
the private marketplace." Id. at 398, 451 A.2d at 184. The court
found it particularly significant that an innocent machine operator
was seriously injured as a result of a commercial decision not to install
a safety device. This suggested the need for the courts to establish a
clear public policy of furthering commercial investments in safety.
The court remarked that as a matter of policy, it was more equitable
to burden the defendant rather than the innocent plaintiff with the
cost of the accident since Cubby could have sought protection either
within the terms of the contract itself or by resorting to the common
law of indemnification. Id. at 398-99, 451 A.2d at 185.
In addition, the court rejected Cubby's argument that the "substantial changes" made in the product by Elastimold, represented by
installation of the electrical and hydraulic systems, relieved it of liability, since the defect, namely the lack of a safety device covering a
moving part, was untouched and unaffected by Elastimold's additional work on the machine. Substantial changes made by a third
party are relevant to a determination of proximate cause, but they
constitute a defense to a strict liability claim only if the change itself
becomes the defect which is the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at
399-400, 451 A.2d at 186. Also on the issue of causation, Cubby
sought to avoid liability by claiming that Elastimold's failure to provide the safety device was a breach of an understanding held by both
parties, which breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury.
The court ruled that "such a combination of causes leading to this
industrial accident would not relieve Cubby of liability," id. at 40001, 451 A.2d at 186, and that Elastimold's subsequent breach of duty
would not, as a matter of law, be a defense to the plaintiff's strict
liability claim against Cubby.
With regard to the defendant's assertion of nonliability, owing to
the absence of a sale to Elastimold, the court pointed out that strict
liability has been imposed in cases where there is a mixture of sales
and services, and further that parties have been found strictly liable in
the absence of a technical sale. Id. at 401, 451 A.2d at 186-87.
Finally, the court ruled that Cubby, as an independent contractor, had a duty to warn of the dangers of the rebuilt press since the
failure to warn may itself constitute a defect in design furnishing a
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basis for a strict liability claim. According to the court, a warning
provides an inexpensive means of making a product safer without
lessening its utility. Id. at 402, 451 A.2d at 187. Cubby argued,
however, that even if it did warn Elastimold, there was no proof that
the latter would have installed a safety device. Therefore, by implication, their failure to warn the owners of the press was not the proximate cause of the injury. The court replied that issues of proximate
causation are properly left to the jury, and a jury could have found
that warnings to Elastimold could have increased the likelihood that
Elastimold would have taken measures to reduce the danger. Moreover, Cubby could have warned foreseeable users of the press, possibly
by affixing a warning on the machine itself. Id. at 402, 451 A.2d at
187. Since Cubby never issued warnings, the court noted that there
was no need to consider whether such warnings would constitute a
defense to a strict liability claim based on the failure to manufacture
or rebuild a safe machine. Id. at n.5, 451 A.2d at 187 n.5.
The holding in this case, which seeks to allocate the cost of
injuries over yet a new class of potential defendants, is consistent with
the basic rationale of the doctrine of strict liability. It will inevitably
place new burdens on those in the business of modifying and rebuilding equipment, but the burden seems reasonable and well placed,
given the cost allocation rationale of this doctrine. The burden is, as
the court noted, not unduly onerous, since this class of defendants can
provide for any risk by the express terms of the contract or by resorting
to the law of indemnification.
J.F.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-SURETYSHIP-INSTITUTION OF ACTION BY
BENEFICIARY To COMPEL TRUSTEE To ACCOUNT IMPOSES No DUTY
ON BENEFICIARY TO NOTIFY SuasrY-In re Estate of Polevski, 186
N.J. Super. 246, 452 A.2d 469 (App. Div. 1982).
In March 1980, Pnina Bar-Yehuda Strauch (Strauch), a beneficiary of a trust created by her deceased sister's will, brought an action
against Richard Feldman, successor trustee since 1976, to compel an
accounting. No notice of the action was given to Indemnity Insurance
Company of North America (Indemnity), which had issued a
$100,000 bond covering Feldman. 186 N.J. Super. at 248, 452 A.2d at
470. When Feldman did not account as directed by the court, he was
ordered to obtain either bonding for an additional $50,000 or a statement from a certified public accountant disclosing his net worth. He
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then applied for an additional bond from Indemnity, but neither he
nor his attorney disclosed the pending litigation to Indemnity leaving
blank this question on the application form. Notwithstanding the
disclosure of what the court characterized as "questionable" investment of the trust funds, Indemnity issued the additional $50,000 bond
signed by them as surety and Feldman as principal. The bond contained the company's standard form provisions, which did not expressly waive any right to jury trial as required by N.J. CT. R. 1:133(b), but did provide that liability could "be enforced on motion
without the necessity of independent action." 186 N.J. Super. at 249,
452 A.2d at 470. Because the bond apparently did not conform to the
court rule, it was rejected by the surrogate's office and returned to
Indemnity by Feldman's attorney for amendment to comply with the
rules. Before this change was made, the court ordered Strauch's attorney to send Indemnity copies of the pleadings. Indemnity then informed Feldman's attorney that it would not extend the bond because
of inadequate disclosure. Id. at 250, 452 A.2d at 470.
As a defense in an action to enforce the bond, Indemnity claimed
that the second bond should not be enforced because of fraud by the
beneficiary of the trust, consisting of alleged concealment of material
facts. Alternatively, Indemnity argued that the rejection of the bond
by the surrogate's office made the bond unenforceable. In addition,
Indemnity asserted a right to a jury trial, claiming that a bond waiving a jury trial was never filed. The trial judge ruled against Indemnity on all three issues. The matter was then taken to the appellate
division which affirmed. Id. at 248, 452 A.2d at 469.
In an opinion by Judge Petrella, the court noted that under N.J.
CT. R. 4:86-3 a complaint to compel an accounting need not name all
persons interested in an account, such as the bonding company, when
the action is initiated by a beneficiary. The naming of all interested
parties is required only in an action to settle an account initiated by a
fiduciary, as set forth in N.J. CT. R. 4:87-1. 186 N.J. Super. at 248,
452 A.2d at 470. Moreover, the court rejected Indemnity's argument
that the beneficiary's failure to notify it of the court action constituted
participation in or knowledge of the false representations of Feldman.
It held that since there had been no claim against Indemnity at that
point, and the beneficiary had no knowledge that the additional
bonding would be sought specifically from Indemnity, the bringing of
the action to compel an accounting imposed no duty on the beneficiary to notify the surety company. Id. at 250-51, 452 A.2d at 471.
The court also dismissed Indemnity's argument that the surrogate's refusal to accept the bond rendered it unenforceable. First the
court noted that the refusal to accept the bond was erroneous. Despite
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the lack of express waiver of the right to a jury trial in the bond, the
court held that the provision specifically allowing the bond to be
enforced by motion in effect constituted the waiver of a jury trial since
a bond would usually be enforced in a summary proceeding on motion. Thus the bond sufficiently complied with the requirements of the
rules. Second, although Indemnity asserted that the surrogate's refusal
to file the bond precluded the contract's arising because contract law
required delivery to and acceptance by the surrogate before the bond
was valid, the court declared that the contract was not between
Indemnity and the surrogate, but between Indemnity and Feldman.
Id. at 252-53, 452 A.2d at 472. Relying on State v. Gonzalez, 69 N.J.
Super. 283, 174 A.2d at 209 (App. Div. 1961), the court held that the
principal and surety on the bond are unconditionally bound by their
signatures before any action is taken by the surrogate. The surrogate
may not declare the bond void; his approval is only directory. 186
N.J. Super. at 253, 452 A.2d at 472. Thus, there was an effective
contract between Indemnity and Feldman and the beneficiary was
entitled to sue to enforce it.
As the court notes, a different result would have occurred under
the same facts if the action had been one by a fiduciary to settle an
account. The surety company would have received notice, allowing it
to avoid further losses. Judge Petrella suggests that this discrepancy
should be considered by the Supreme Court's Civil Practice Committe. Meanwhile, surety companies must rely on information supplied by the principal to alert them to current litigation in suits such as
this, despite their significant financial interest in the matter.

